Fiscal transfer in Australia: Review and relevance to India. by Rangarajan, C. & Srivastava, D.K.
2
Fiscal Transfers in Australia:
Review and Relevance to India3
Fiscal Transfers in Australia:





This paper examines the working of Australia’s fiscal transfer
system in the context of its long term evolution, paying particular
attention to salient changes that have occurred since the introduction of
a comprehensive Goods and Services Tax (GST). The GST has served
to increase the vertical imbalance in the system, which was high even
prior to this change, by placing more revenue resources with the
commonwealth government in Australia. In spite of a high degree of
expenditure centralisation, considerable emphasis is placed in Australia
for achieving horizontal fiscal equalisation through an elaborate
mechanism of equalisation transfers, which looks into both revenue and
expenditure sides of the state budgets and calculates revenue and
expenditure ‘disabilities’ that account for departures from a pure equal
per capita distribution of the shareable amounts. This paper looks at the
equity and efficiency implications of the Australian equalisation transfers
and considers its relevance for the Indian system, which has many
comparable features. Apart from the need for making equalising features
of the Indian transfer system more transparent, there is need for
emphasising some cost disabilities, particularly those that are structural
and exogenous in nature.4
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The working of fiscal federalism in Australia is now more than
hundred years old. It was in 1901 that Australia became a federation,
when six separate British colonies came together forming a
commonwealth and becoming as a consequence its states. These states
are Queensland, New South Wales (NSW), Southern Australia (SA),
Victoria, Western Australia (WA), and Tasmania. In addition, there are
two territorial administrations, viz., the Northern Territories (NT), and the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT). Australia’s federal fiscal structure is
characterised by a high level of vertical imbalance, an elaborate system
of horizontal fiscal equalisation, and numerous special purpose
payments. The centerpiece of the Australian system of fiscal transfers is
horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE) that looks into both revenue and
expenditure sides of the state budgets and calculates revenue and
expenditure ‘disabilities’ that account for departures from a pure equal
per capita distribution of the shareable amounts. Australian equalisation
calculations, cast in terms of ‘disabilities’, and state ‘relativities’ rather
than the more usual term of state shares, are distinct in their
presentational scheme. The Australian fiscal transfers system is also
unique in having developed an institutional framework for five-yearly
`Reviews’ and annual `Updates’ of the relativities as also for having
developed techniques of micro assessments, particularly on the
expenditure side.
Currently, the Australian system of fiscal transfers is going
through a major transition with the introduction of a comprehensive
Goods and Services Tax (GST), which is in the nature of a Value Added
Tax. The introduction of GST has had a far reaching influence on the
vertical and horizontal sharing of resources among the commonwealth
and state governments. The GST is collected by the commonwealth
Government and fully passed on to the states. It by itself accounts for8
almost the entire untied transfers, and since it has come in replacement
of several state level taxes, its distribution significantly affects the
availability of resources to the states.  The commonwealth Grants
Commission (CGC), which is the main institution that makes
recommendations about the horizontal fiscal transfers, has come out, in
its 2004 Review, with a new set of recommendations for years covering
the period after 2003-04. There is an extensive contemporary debate in
Australia about the relevance and implications of the manner in which
the principle of horizontal fiscal equalisation has been applied,
particularly after the introduction of the GST and the proliferation of the
Special Purpose Payments. It is some indication of the disenchantment
of some of the states that three states, viz., New South Wales, Victoria,
and Western Australia, i.e. the so-called better off and ‘donor states’
jointly appointed a Review Committee comprising two eminent experts
Ross Garnaut and Vince FitZerald to assess the current system of
transfers in terms of economic efficiency, equity, simplicity, and
transparency. The disenchantment reached such a peak that after the
2004 Review, New South Wales took out an advertisement in the
newspapers asking the citizens of the state to send telegrams to the
Prime Minister expressing their dissatisfaction. The commonwealth
Grants Commission itself observes in its Report containing the 2004
Review that the Commission “is supportive of a far-reaching review of
equalisation, including its underlying purposes and objectives” and that
the Commission itself did not go into these questions because these
were not part of its terms of reference. The transfers system in India is
facing similar questions today.
Australia’s system of horizontal fiscal equalisation and the
related debates on equity and efficiency are relevant for other fiscal
transfer systems including that of India. In this paper, we examine the
working of the Australian system with a view to drawing comparisons
with the corresponding Indian fiscal transfer system and deriving
appropriate lessons. Section 1 looks at the assignment of revenues and
responsibilities in Australia. Section 2 summarises the institutional
arrangements in Australia that play a key role in the working of the
federal fiscal arrangements. Section 3 looks at the state economies in
Australia and their demographic features drawing appropriate
comparisons with India. Section 4 examines the extent of vertical
imbalance in Australia as well as India. Section 5 reviews the
arrangements of horizontal fiscal equalisation, highlighting the use of
revenue and cost disabilities in deriving states’ shares in the overall9
untied transfers. Section 7 provides a summary of the key features of the
Australian system of fiscal transfers focusing on practices that can be
adopted with benefit in the Indian context.
I. Assignment of Powers and Functions
In Australia, the functions of the commonwealth government
relate to foreign affairs, foreign trade, defense, immigration, currency and
banking.  The states have responsibilities in respect of public safety,
housing, transport, community, and social services.  The state
governments also have jurisdiction over local governments.
Responsibilities such as maintaining the road system, recreational and
cultural services and public services like water supply and sewerage
have been delegated to the local governments.
The central government has the power to levy all taxes and the
states have concurrent powers except in the case of customs and excise
duty. At the inception of the federation, the constitution was so framed as
to give exclusive powers on the customs and excise revenues to the
commonwealth. Further, starting in 1908, the High Court has consistently
interpreted these powers more and more in favuor of the central
government by extending the definition of excises.  In particular, states
have not been permitted to levy sales taxes. The local bodies depend
mainly on property taxes.
Prior to the taking over of the income tax by the commonwealth,
states were raising more than 70 percent of the total income tax revenue
collected in Australia, way back in 1938-39. Ceding access to this
revenue source to the commonwealth during the war years completely
reversed the relative position of the commonwealth and state
governments in revenue raising powers. With the Uniform  Income
Taxation Act of 1942 eliminating the role of states in raising income tax,
and subsequent court rulings closing sales and excise taxation fields to
the states, most of the important taxes on individuals, enterprises and
non-residents stand assigned to the commonwealth.  With the GST also
being collected by the commonwealth as a result of the Inter-10
Government Agreement (IGA) in 2000, its domination of the tax field is
near-complete. The states’ most important own tax  revenue sources are
the payroll tax that is levied on company payrolls, taxes on financial and
capital transactions, taxes on gambling, on insurances and on  motor
vehicles.  The states also employ franchise fees and taxes on excisable
goods converted into service taxes for constitutional reasons. Local
governments are given taxes on immovable property at the municipal
rates.
The IGA, finalised in 2000, was aimed at achieving a new
national tax system which is not distortionary and which also improves
the financial position of the state governments. These reforms have led
to the implementation of GST, which is presently set at the uniform rate
of 10 percent. There is some ambiguity as to whether the GST should be
considered a federal tax or a state tax. The commonwealth itself has
argued that the GST should be regarded as a state tax, which the
commonwealth collects on behalf of the state governments and fully
returns to them. The Australian Bureau of Statistics treats the GST as a
commonwealth tax. This seems appropriate because the commonwealth
is not collecting the GST on behalf of the states and returning it to them
on the basis of derivation. The commonwealth has itself given up the
wholesale sales tax and it is using the GST revenues for distribution
among states on equalisation principles. The GST revenue sharing
arrangements do not have constitutional force although these are based
on the IGA.
Table 1 shows that the commonwealth government collects 76
percent of all government revenues. About 20 percent is collected by the
state governments and the remaining by the local governments. This
high degree of centralisation in raising revenues arises primarily from the
fact that more than 50 percent of all tax revenues are raised as income
tax followed by the GST, which contributes about 11 percent of the total
and excise and levies that contribute a little more than 8 percent, all
being with the commonwealth government.















Total taxes of which 76.35 19.73 3.33 0.59
Income taxes 50.59 0.00 0.00 0.00
Payroll taxes 1.50 3.98 0.00 0.00
Taxes on property 0.01 5.20 2.67 0.00
Goods and services tax 10.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
Excise and levies 8.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
Taxes on international
trade 1.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income from Government
Business  Enterprises 1.23 2.24 0.00 0.01
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Taxation Revenue, and Government Finance
statistics
  Table 2 shows the extent of centralisation in expenditures, i.e.
the situation after transfers. About 52 percent of expenditures are
incurred by the central government in total expenditures. There are
several fields that the commonwealth government co-occupies with the
state governments, particularly those relating to health, housing and
community amenities, and some economic sectors like fuel and energy,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing, mining, manufacturing, and
construction.
Table 3 shows the corresponding picture for India using 2000-01
data. Apart from defence, the centre has a share higher than that of the
states in housing, industries, and transport. In most of the social and
economic services, it is the states that have the larger shares of
expenditures.






















General public services 51 40 9 1 19046
Defense 100 0 0 0 11327
Public order and safety 14 82 3 0 10745
Education 5 69 0 26 35777
Health 46 53 1 0 41179
Social security and welfare 91 8 1 0 72059
Housing and community
Amenities 28 46 26 0 10583
Recreation and culture 31 41 29 0 6592
Fuel and energy 70 30 0 0 3760
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 45 55 0 0 3857
Mining, manuf. and construction 55 33 12 0 1876
Transport and communications 15 67 18 0 15549
Other economic affairs 46 50 3 0 6586
Total 52 39 5 4 238936
* This category includes only Universities
    Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics as quoted in Madden (2202)
Table 3: Relative Share of Centre and States in India: Selected
Heads(2000-01)
  Share of  Combined
Centre States (Amount in Rs.
  (percent) (percent)  crore)
Defence services 100.0 0.0 49622
Fiscal services 46.0 54.0 9015
Administrative services 35.2 64.8 34897
Organs of State 37.6 62.4 4261
Pension & other retirement benefits 36.6 63.4 38819
Education, art & culture 11.1 88.9 63756
Medical & public health, water supply &
sanitation 11.5 88.5 24360
Family welfare 23.5 76.5 2826
Housing 56.6 43.4 415613
Table 3: Relative Share of Centre and States in India: Selected
Heads(2000-01)
  Share of  Combined
Centre States (Amount in Rs.
  (percent) (percent)  crore)
Agriculture & allied services 32.4 67.6 35140
Industry & minerals less DCUs 57.8 42.2 6762
Power, irrigation & flood control 11.8 88.2 33799
Transport & communications 51.3 48.7 24492
Public works 17.6 82.4 4007
Total 44.6 55.4 553533
Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics
Note: Centre’s expenditures are derived by deducting State expenditures from the combined
amounts.
II. Institutional Arrangements of Fiscal
Coordination
The framework of institutions dealing with financial and other
matters between the centre and the sub-national governments is critical
for the successful functioning of central-state financial relations. In India,
apart from the constitutional provision for a Finance Commission, there
are other institutions like the Planning Commission, the Inter-State
Council and the National Development Council. In Australia, there are
five bodies that play a key role in the management of the federal fiscal
system. These are described below.
A.  Council of Australian Governments
  This council consists of the Prime Minister, State Premiers and
Chief Ministers of the Territories. This council has superseded the
Premiers’ Conference that earlier decided about the vertical transfers.
Since now there is an agreement to transfer the full amount of GST to
the states, the volume of untied transfers to that extent gets determined
automatically.14
B.  Ministerial Council for Commonwealth-State Financial
Relations
This council, which is also known as the Treasurers’ Conference,
provides a platform for an annual meeting of the Treasurers (Finance
Ministers) of the states and Territories to discuss grant allocations to the
states (until recently this was done at the Premiers’ Conference).
C.  Special Purpose Ministerial Councils
These councils consist of the commonwealth and State Ministers
of a particular portfolio. These councils look after a wide range of special
purpose payments.
D.  Commonwealth Grants Commission
The main body entrusted with the task of making
recommendations regarding the horizontal transfers of sharable
resources in Australia is the commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC).
The CGC is an advisory body that responds to its terms of reference. It
does not have powers to initiate and pursue inquiries on its own. In
recent years, the main references have sought advice on per capita
relativities for distributing the distributable pool of resources among the
states and territories.
The Commission was established in 1933 to assess claims
made by the states for financial assistance (special grants) under section
96 of the constitution. At various times, Queensland, Western Australia,
South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory had sought special
grants.
Various issues are referred to the CGC under sections 16, 16A
and 16AA of the Commonwealth Grants Commission Act 1973. Although
references to the CGC are provided by the Minister for Finance and
Administration, their content is usually decided in negotiations between
the commonwealth and the states, conducted largely through their
treasuries. While the resulting Commission reports are provided formally
to the Commonwealth Government, they are made available to the15
states immediately thereafter. The relativities recommended in those
reports are considered at the annual Treasurers’ Conference.
The CGC defines its own role as “an independent, impartial and
authoritative arbiter in relation to distributional aspects of fiscal
federalism in Australia” (Commonwealth Grants Commission, 1983,
p/160). The CGC looks at the state budgets in a comprehensive manner
and looks at all needs, whether on current or capital account. There is no
fragmentation in approach as is the case in India where expenditures are
divided into revenue and capital accounts, and further into plan and non-
plan categories, with two bodies,  viz., Finance and Planning
Commissions looking after different segments of the expenditure
requirements.
Unlike in India, where the Finance Commission looks at both the
vertical and horizontal dimensions of transfers, the CGC does not look
into the issue of vertical imbalance. With the introduction of GST, the
vertical transfers are determined by the amount of actual collections of
the GST, supplemented by the Health Care Grants (HCG). Prior to the
GST, the pool of transfer consisted of Financial Assistance Grants (FAG)
and the HCG. In addition, the commonwealth government pays special
purpose payments (SPPs), which are conditional grants aimed at specific
sectors. The SPPs are broadly comparable to the centrally sponsored
schemes in India.
For the 2004 Review, the terms of reference asked the CGC to
review the methods used to determine and report upon the question of
the per capita relativities for distribution of GST revenue grants and
health care grants which the Commission would regard as appropriate to
apply after 2003-04
1. The Commission was also asked to continue to
prepare its assessments on the basis that SPPs quarantined, i.e.
excluded in the previous terms of reference should continue not to affect
the per capita relativities
2.
In preparing its assessment, the Commission was asked to have
regard for the need to observe policy neutrality in relation to a reduction
in the level of a SPPs resulting from non-compliance by a state or
territory with the conditions of the payment.  Any such reductions should
not directly influence the commission’s assessments of the per capita
relativities.  The commission was asked to prepare its assessments on a
basis consistent with the commonwealth’s intention that specified16
components
3 of the Australian Health Care Agreements between the
commonwealth and a state should not directly influence the per capita
relativities.
E.  The Australian Loan Council
Australia is unique among federations in that it has a mechanism
in the form of the Australian Loan Council to coordinate borrowing by the
commonwealth and state governments. Effective control of public sector
borrowings is a major concern for all federations as government
borrowing is linked with monetary policy and macroeconomic demand
management. Unrestrained borrowing can compromise fiscal discipline
by softening the budget constraints to governments at all levels. The
Loan Council was set up by the Financial Agreement of 1927, as ratified
by a constitutional amendment in 1928, to provide an effective control of
borrowings by the state governments and state business enterprises.
      The Loan Council's origins lie in the 1920s when the
commonwealth and states competed for funds on the capital markets.
The commonwealth wanted to refinance war debt while the states
wanted to fund infrastructure programmes. To resolve this and other
conflicts, the May 1923 Premiers' Conference agreed to form a voluntary
Loan Council. The Loan Council is formally a Commonwealth-State
Ministerial Council comprising the Commonwealth Treasurer as
chairman, and state and territory Treasurers. The Financial Agreement
Act 1928 provided among other things for:
•  the Loan Council to regulate borrowing by the commonwealth
and states
•  the commonwealth to borrow on the states' behalf
•  limits on the states' borrowing powers
•  the commonwealth and the states to contribute to the National
Debt Sinking Fund to redeem debt, and
•  The commonwealth to provide grants to the states to help them
meet interest payments and sinking fund contributions.
    The 1928 Financial Agreement has been altered on a number
of occasions to take account of new developments. The 1928 Agreement
did not encompass borrowing by commonwealth and state semi-
governmental and local authorities. As the Loan Council’s restrictions
became stringent, the states found ways of circumventing the council by17
using statutory authorities for borrowing. In 1936, a voluntary
‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ was negotiated to bring such borrowing under
the supervision of the Loan Council.
A major change in the role of the Loan Council took place in the
1950s when the commonwealth increasingly saw it as an instrument of
macroeconomic policy. Early in the 1950s, Australia had faced strong
inflationary pressures, and the Commonwealth Treasurer advocated
reducing council-approved borrowing to ease these pressures. The
commonwealth's influence over the Loan Council was strengthened by
the fact that the commonwealth undertook to provide funds to the states
if the states were unable to raise, through the issue of securities, any
borrowing that the Loan Council had approved. In effect, the
commonwealth agreed to underwrite state borrowing.
The Gentlemen's Agreement was also bypassed when some
states used 'unconventional' financing techniques such as financial
leases to circumvent its restrictions. The States also established
borrowing authorities like the New South Wales Treasury Corporation,
which was used to circumvent the Loan Council borrowing limits. In
1984, the Loan Council suspended the Gentlemen's Agreement and
replaced it with Global Borrowing Limits. This 'global approach', among
other things, limited the level of all new borrowings, conventional and
unconventional, by commonwealth and state authorities.
However, the global approach also broke down. A major reason
was the increasing use of sophisticated financing techniques that eroded
the Loan Council's effectiveness. In December 1992, the Loan Council
meeting adopted new arrangements for monitoring and reporting. Under
these arrangements which came into effect in 1993-94, each jurisdiction
nominated a Loan Council Allocation, which was based on its net
borrowings as indicated by its deficit/surplus. The arrangements also
changed the way in which borrowings were allocated among the states.
Previously, the global limit was allocated by a formula based on state
population. But this formula did not take account of a state's particular
fiscal circumstances. The Loan Council, therefore, considered the
nominations having regard to each jurisdiction's fiscal position and
'reasonable' infrastructure needs as well as the macroeconomic
implications of the total nominations.18
The Financial Agreement Act 1994 came into effect on 1 July
1995. The Financial Agreement includes changes agreed at the June
1992 Loan Council meeting. These changes:
•  removed the requirement for commonwealth and state
borrowings to be approved under the Agreement
•  removed the commonwealth's explicit power to borrow on
the states' behalf
•  abolished the restriction on State's borrowing through the
issue of securities in their own names, and
•  Included the Australian Capital Territory and Northern
Territory as members (they previously had observer status).
These changes, particularly the removal of the requirement for
approval of borrowing, constitute a major restructuring of the Loan
Council powers. Current arrangements seek to emphasise transparency
of public sector finances, through financial market scrutiny of proposed
borrowing to restrict borrowing to prudent levels. The Loan Council
meets once a year to consider the nominations having regard to each
jurisdiction's fiscal position.
The Loan Council’s allocations are not binding in a legal sense.
According to its own statement the Loan Council has moved from an
approach based on rigid compliance to that of a credible and transparent
framework for the allocation of net borrowings. To ensure that
borrowings are consistent with the state’s fiscal and debt position and the
nation’s overall macroeconomic strategy, the Loan Council has
implemented a joint commonwealth/state forecasting exercise. The
National Fiscal Outlook contained nationally agreed debt targets and
states’ nominations were considered in that light. This arrangement
continued until 1998. Since then each government’s own forecasts are
used to set their targets. Governments are required to present three-year
forward estimates as well as actual outcomes within a uniform
presentation framework. Discipline is now exercised by ratings by
international rating agencies, and majority of states have got very good
ratings. Most states are now in budget surplus.19
III. Australian States: Population and Incomes
Australia is world's smallest continent but the sixth largest
country, with population concentrated along the eastern and
southeastern coasts. Its arable land is only 6.88 percent of total area.
Australia is rich in several minerals, particularly, bauxite, coal, and iron
ore. In terms of 2001 figures, the share of agriculture in the economy
was only 3 percent, with industry having a share of 26 percent, and
services having a share of about 71 percent. As shown by Table 4, New
South Wales and Victoria are the two biggest states in terms of
population. The total population of Australia is about 20 million. In
contrast, India has 28 states and 7 union territories and its population
size is more than 50 times as large as that of Australia.
Table 4:Australia: Mean Resident Population: 1997-98 to 2002-03














New South Wales 33.89 33.88 33.87 33.87 33.84 33.71
Victoria 24.81 24.78 24.76 24.76 24.74 24.74
Queensland 18.38 18.46 18.55 18.64 18.79 19.00
Western Australia 9.72 9.76 9.78 9.79 9.80 9.81
Southern Australia 7.98 7.94 7.89 7.82 7.76 7.71
Tasmania 2.54 2.51 2.48 2.45 2.42 2.40
Australian Capital Territory 1.66 1.65 1.65 1.64 1.64 1.63
Northern Territories 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.00
Australia 100 100 100 100 100 100
Australia (million) 18.61 18.82 19.04 19.28 19.53 19.76
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004 Review, Supporting Information
In terms of per capita gross state product (GSP), the richest
states, leaving the territories are Western Australia followed by New
South Wales and Victoria. While economic activities are more
concentrated in NSW and Victoria, Western Australia is richer in mineral
resources. The relatively less well-off states are South Australia,
Queensland, and Tasmania. Table 5 shows the statewise per capita20
Gross State Products. The ratio of the highest per capita GSP to lowest
per capita GSP among states (Western Australia/ Tasmania) is only 1.5.
This ratio, when the territories are included is 1.6. The corresponding
ratios in India’s case are far higher, showing that difference in fiscal
capacities is much lower in Australia compared to that in India.
           Table 5 :Australia: Gross State Product at Current Prices
  1997-98 2002-03 1997-98 2002-03
  $ per capita $ per capita Relative to average
New South Wales 31837 40127 105.65 105.18
Victoria 30433 39058 100.99 102.38
Queensland 26623 33782 88.35 88.55
Western Australia 33939 42269 112.63 110.79
Southern Australia 26297 32294 87.27 84.65
Tasmania 22467 27100 74.56 71.03
Australian Capital Territory 36389 47438 120.76 124.34
Northern Territories 32208 45870 106.88 120.23
Australia 30134 38151 100.00 100.00
Ratio of Max pcGSP to Minimum  
Among States only 1.51 1.56
Among States and Territories 1.62 1.75    
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004 Review, Supporting Information
The main states, which serve as ‘donor’ states, i.e. those who
get less than per capita entitlement in the exercise of redistribution
through the fiscal transfer mechanism, are New South Wales and
Victoria (see table 9). Such redistribution is relatively easier to handle as
most of the population is concentrated in these two states. In contrast,
the recipient states have lower population. Such redistribution is far more
difficult in India where a large proportion of population is concentrated in
the low fiscal capacity states. Recognising this feature in Australia,
Mathews (1993) had observed, “Fiscal equalisation is achieved more
easily if the states with low fiscal capacity also have relatively small
populations, because transfers involving small per capita payments from
the federal (or other granting) government are translated into large per
capita grants for the recipient governments”.21
IV. Vertical Transfers and Vertical Imbalance
Unconditional general revenue assistance as well as specific
purpose grants is given to the states according to Section 96 of the
constitution.  General revenue assistance is given for recurrent as well
as for capital purposes. SPPs in the form of  recurrent  or capital grants
are given for specific  state functions like social services including health,
education, social security, and welfare, economic services (roads,
transport, industry assistance, water resources) and other services
(housing and urban renewal, regional development, disaster relief and
debt charges). Three types of payments can be distinguished (i)
payments to states for funding direct state outlays; (ii) payments through
the states to be passed on to other bodies or individuals; and (iii) direct
payments to local governments.
The evolution of the extent and shape of vertical transfers in
Australia in more recent years can be seen in terms of four distinct
phases, viz., prior to 1976 when general revenue assistance was given
to states, 1976 to 1985 when revenue sharing arrangements were put in
place, 1986 to 1997 when the system of financial assistance grants was
reintroduced, and after the intergovernmental agreement in 2000, which
provides for the sharing of the GST revenues.
Phase 1: Upto 1976: General Revenue Assistance
Prior to 1976, general revenue assistance in the form of
Financial Assistance Grants (FAG) was given to each state, determined
largely by a formula subject to variation through commonwealth-state
negotiations.  Financial  assistance grants were  increased annually
(From 1959 to 1976) by a formula stressing three factors for each state,
viz., population changes, average wage increases, and a  so-called
betterment factor designed to allow the states to expand their relative
level of  services.
Phase 2: 1976-1985: Revenue Sharing Arrangements
In 1976, as part of the Fraser Government’s  ‘New Federalism’
policy, the untied financial assistance  grants were replaced by ‘tax22
sharing entitlements’, whereby the  states received a fixed percentage of
commonwealth  personal income tax receipts, distributed on the basis of
existing per capita   relativities. Access to personal income taxation was
reopened to the states.  However, the states declined to impose personal
income taxes of their own and the commonwealth did not make room for
them by reducing commonwealth personal income tax.   A state that took
up the option would have had to impose an additional tax or surcharge.
 Sharing was first adopted for the income tax alone.    The pool
was formed by applying first a fixed proportion and later an increasing
proportion of the tax proceeds collected in the states.  This lead to the
states’ revenues being determined by factors similar to those used for
financial assistance grants before. Later, revenue sharing was extended
to federal tax receipts as a whole, which somewhat lowered the rate of
growth of the states’ revenue pool.
Phase 3: 1986-1997: Reintroduction of Financial Assistance Grants
Financial assistance grants were reintroduced in 1986. The size
of pool was determined by the percentage growth rate set to reflect
specified real changes in assistance, which could be negative when
fiscal restraint was called for.  From 1990 the commonwealth had agreed
to maintain the real value of such grants in order to provide greater
certainty in the funding of the state budgets.
The extent of vertical fiscal imbalance between revenue powers
and expenditure responsibilities in the federation increased substantially
in 1997, when the states lost the capacity to impose business franchise
fees on liquor, tobacco and petroleum products.  This resulted from the
High Court decision, which held that such fees are in the nature of
excises and reserved for the commonwealth.  The commonwealth
compensated the states for their lost revenue by increasing its own
excise on those products and returning   the revenue to the states in the
form of a new component of untied grants.
Phase 4: GST Sharing and the Inter-Governmental Agreement, 1999
The Intergovernmental Reform Agreement on the Reform of
Commonwealth-State Financial Relations (IGA) was signed in April
1999. It dealt with the GST-based reforms in the tax system. This
agreement was revised in May 1999 as a result of negotiations between23
the federal government and the Democrats. The final agreement
provided for the levy of GST at the uniform rate of 10 percent.
Concurrently, the federal government abolished the wholesale sales tax
and the state governments abolished the Financial institutions duty, Bed
taxes (in NSW and Northern Territories), Stamp duty on quoted
marketable securities, and the debits tax. It was also agreed that several
remaining stamp duties would be taken up for review in 2005.
The IGA also provided for the replacement of the Financial
Assistance Grants (FAGs) by GST revenue sharing. The overall package
of transfers now consists of the GST revenues to the extent of 100
percent, health care grants (HCG), and special purpose payments
(SPPs).
The GST and related arrangements have increased the vertical
imbalance in raising revenues because some state taxes have been
abolished while enlarging the scope of fiscal equalisation through larger
overall amount of untied transfers. In order to smoothen the transition,
particularly for the states who lose more from the abolished taxes than
gain from the larger divisible pool, provision has been made for giving a
Guaranteed Minimum Amount (GMA) in the form of Budget Balancing
Assistance (BBA) consisting of interest free loans and grants to cover the
difference between the share in GST revenue and the GMA. Accordingly
the CGC has been asked to calculate two sets of relativities, one based
on the sharing of the GST-HCG pool, and the other on the earlier FAGs
on the assumption that the old system continued. Appendix A1 gives the
difference between FAG and GST relativities as assessed in the 2004
Review. The relativities differ because, among other things, states have
given up some resources as part of IGA and the amount under
distribution through GST is larger.  Analysing the impact of the IGA, in a
recent analysis, Collins (2000) observes: “Since the new arrangements
will involve the application of newly-calculated GST relativities to a GST
funds pool that will be in the order of  35% higher than the FAG pool, any
inequities in the HFE process will tend to be magnified over time.”
Table 6 looks at the vertical fiscal imbalance at the level of
raising resources in Australia. The commonwealth raised nearly 29
percent more revenues than what it required to spend in 1993-94. This
vertical imbalance in raising revenues increased after the introduction of
GST. In 2000-01, the commonwealth government raised nearly 40
percent more revenue than it required to spend on its own. This vertical24
imbalance has been accompanied by high degree of centralisation in
expenditures with the commonwealth government spending about 56-57
percent of total expenditure up to 1999-00, and 52 percent after the
introduction of GST. The share of commonwealth expenditure in total
expenditure has come down in 2000-01 to 52 percent.














Own Source Revenue: Relative
Shares    
Commonwealth 72.6 73.6 73.1 73.1 74.8 76.4
States and Local
governments 27.4 26.4 26.9 26.9 25.2 23.7
Own Purpose Expenditures: Relative Shares    
Commonwealth 56.4 57.8 57.1 55.6 55 52.0
States and Local
governments 43.6 42.2 42.9 44.4 45 48.0
Source:  Adapted  from Collins (2000) for 1993-94 to 1997-98, Searle(2002) for 1999-00
and Madden(2002) for 2000-01
In contrast, as indicated in Table 7, in India, nearly 60 percent of
total revenues are raised by the central government and its share in the
combined total expenditure of the centre and states is about 43 percent.
Thus, both in raising revenues and incurring expenditures India is less
centralised than Australia.
            Table 7 :Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in India: Selected Years
  1993-94 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1999-00 2000-01
Revenue Receipts: Relative Share of Centre and States in Accrual
Centre         60.65 60.67 62.81 60.80 61.60 59.24
States 39.35 39.33 37.19 39.20 38.40 40.76
Expenditures: Relative Share of Centre and States after Transfers
Centre 42.52 42.80 42.47 43.49 43.17 41.67
States 57.48 57.20 57.53 56.51 56.83 58.33
Source( Basic data): Indian Public Finance Statistics
In the case of receipts from the total interest receipts paid by the states to centre
Are netted out.  The relative share of centre and the states in the total expenditure is also
influenced by their respective shares in borrowing.25
V. Horizontal Transfers: System of Fiscal
Equalisation
The main task of the Commission is to advise the commonwealth
government on the distribution among the states and territories of the
revenue from the GST and Commonwealth Health Grants. The
Commission operates such that a full review of state shares including the
methods used to calculate them is undertaken every five years, and in
the intermediate years shares are updated annually, using the latest
available figures and the methods of the last review. The reviews have
been done in 1981, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. The review
process is aimed at ensuring that the relativities reflect changes over
time in the circumstances of the states, developments in public
administration, and trends in service delivery.
The heart of horizontal transfers system is fiscal equalisation,
which is defined by the CGC as follows “State governments should
receive funding from the pool of goods and services tax revenue and
health care grants such that, if each made the same effort to raise
revenue from its own sources and operated at the same level of
efficiency, each would have the capacity to provide services at the same
standard”. The Australian equalisation differs from the Canadian
equalisation owing to the reference to efficiency and standard of
services. The Canadian system makes reference only to equalisation in
fiscal capacity. In Australia, fiscal equalisation looks at both the revenue
and expenditure sides.
The CGC makes reference to ‘three pillars’  supporting and
guiding the application of equalisation. These are capacity equalisation,
internal service standards, and policy neutrality. Policy neutrality refers to
the consideration that state’s own policies or choices about services
should not directly influence the level of grants it receives. The CGC’s
calculations are based on all-state averages so that these may reflect
average efficiency. These are also treated as ensuring policy neutrality
being the result of policy decisions of all states. There is a
comprehensive coverage of the services provided by the states and the
revenues raised by them.26
A.  Equalisation: From Disabilities to Relativities
            The CGC recognises that since states have differential fiscal
capacities and different demographic, economic, and physical
circumstances, there will be differences in their revenue raising
capacities and relative costs of providing services. Relative differences
that are beyond the control of individual state governments are called
‘disabilities’. Standards of services as well as the disabilities are
measured relative to the all-state position.
The first step in the equalisation exercise is the preparation of
the standard budget. The standards are equal to all-state averages in
expenditures as well as revenues. The Commission does not consider
any exogenous targets or norms. Any departure from the average per
capita expenditure needs to be justified on account of cost disabilities.
The equalisation budget brings together all expense and revenue
categories of state budgets. The per capita expense for each service that
the state would incur if it were to provide the Australian average standard
of service is calculated. On the revenue side, the per capita revenue
each state would raise if it applied the average revenue effort to its
revenue base is calculated.  Expenditure assessment adjusts the
standard expenses to allow for the effects of disabilities. Disabilities are
broadly classified as use disabilities and cost disabilities, according to
whether they affect the rate of use or the cost of each unit of service.
Use disabilities reflect differences between states in the use of services
as a result of factors such as population characteristics and the
availability of private services. Cost disabilities are influences that affect
the cost per unit of service provided to particular groups or places, e.g.
large cities or remote areas. Cultural and communication factors can
increase the costs of providing some services to people from cultural and
linguistically diverse backgrounds. Some cost disabilities arise due to
variation in inter-state prices as also due to diseconomies of scale.
On the revenue side, tax bases are generally measured using
the value of transaction in each state that would be taxed under the
average tax policy. For example, the value of the payroll tax is the
estimated annual value of payrolls above a threshold level paid by the
private sector businesses and most public trading enterprises. Table 8
gives some of the major revenue and expenditure side factors taken into
account in the assessment of disabilities.27
Table 8: Main Factors affecting Revenue and Cost Disabilities
 Revenue Bases  Factors affecting Expenditures
GSP per capita Share of Australian Population
Payrolls of large businesses Proportion of population aged 65 years or over
Sales of real estate Proportion of population who are indigenous
Value of commercial/industrial land
Proportion of population resident in centers of
50000 or more
Value of mining production Proportion of population resident in remote areas
Proportion of population enrolled in government
schools
Proportion of population with low income
Relative average weekly earnings
  Relative length of arterial roads
A mathematical presentation of the equalisation methodology
can be provided, using symbols defined as below:
ei = standardised per capita expenditure of state i; ?i = expenditure
disability of state i
ri = standardised per capita revenue of state i; ?i = revenue disability of
state I
oi = per capita special purpose payment of state i;
ds = per capita budget surplus; d i = ds for all states
Ni = population of state i; ? Ni =population of all states
Subscript‘s’ indicates corresponding numbers for the all-state averages.
The per capita all-state average grant  is given by
                           gs = es- rs + ds - os                                                         (1)
The per capita grant to state i is given by
                          gi = ei- ri + di - oi                                                             (2)
Here, ei and ri refer to standardised expenditure and revenue for
state i, di is the standard budget surplus, which is common for all states28
and oi is the given special purpose payment. All standardisations are
made in relation to corresponding all-state averages which provide the
standard, and the relevant expenditure and revenue terms can be written
as
                     ei = ?i es,  ri= ?i rs                                                              (3)
For a given state the standardised expenditure and revenue will
be the summation of  standardised expenditures on different categories
and standardised revenues from different sources. The SPPs are
considered exogenously determined. The CGC determines first the total
grants and derives the untied grants by deducting the SPPs (oi) that are
treated by inclusion. Grants inclusive of the SPPs may be written as g*
and per capita untied grants as g, where
                     g*i = gi + oi                                                                           (4)
There are three ways in which the derivation of the share in
GST-HCG transfers can be presented: the standardised model version,
the needs version, and the normative gap version. For this purpose, we
focus on g*i, from which gi is derived by deducting the SPP grants.
(a) Standardised Model Version
In this version, we write the state-specific terms as ratios to the
all-state averages. Substituting the terms in equation (3) in equation (2),
we have
                   g
*
i  = ?i es  - ?i rs  + ds                                                          (5)
and                 gi  = g
*
i  - o i                                                                        (6)
Thus, the financial assistance to a state is the excess of
assessed expenditure over assessed revenues, both written as fractions
of the all-state averages plus a budget surplus which is common for all
states, minus the special purpose grants treated by inclusion.
(b) Needs Version
Substituting  rs-es =ds in (5), we can write what is known as the
needs version of the grant equation. Thus,29
                      g
*
i  = [(?i – 1)es + (1-?i )rs ]                                                 7)
This indicates that the essence of the exercise is the departure
of the disabilities ?i and ?i from 1. Further, total grants can be seen as the
sum of expenditure disabilities and revenue disabilities. This equation
also makes clear the difference between the Australian and Canadian
systems. In the Canadian system only the second term, that is, revenue
disability is operative and no consideration is given to the expenditure
side disability. This implies that implicitly ?i is put equal to 1. The revenue
disability (?i) in Australia [p.350 of the CGC 2004 Review, Supporting
Information]is measured by the ratio of states i’s revenue base (bi) and
the average per capita revenue base (bs). Thus,  ?i  = bi/bs. Substituting
this in equation 7 and setting ?i =1, we have
                      g
*
i =rs -?i rs = abs – a bi                                                      (8)
where a =  rs/ bs, i.e. the average tax rate.
This describes the method of determining untied transfers in
Canada (see Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2004 for a discussion).
A third way in which the determination of grants can be written is
what might be called the normative gap version. This would facilitate
comparison with the Indian system as well.
(c) Normative Gap Version
 The term  ?i es  can also be written as
                        es ?i = es + (?i – 1)es                                                       (9)
From equation (5)
                     g
*
i  = es – ?i rs + (?i – 1)es + ds                                         (10)
Substituting  a.bi for ?i rs  , we can write
g
*
i  = es – a bi   + ßi es + ds          [where ßi=(?i – 1)]
The term es can be written as az where z is a constant [es/a=z]30
                        g
*
i  = a[z–bi ]+ ßi es + ds                                                 (11)
The first term is the term comparable to the distance criterion
used in the tax sharing formula in India. However, the distance from
which the revenue base of a state is measured is different in the Indian
formulation. The expenditure term is also comparable to the
supplementary factors representing factors accounting for more than
average costs like area and infrastructure. The term ds is constant and
therefore reflects the population term in the devolution formula. Thus, the
Australian formula is comparable to the Indian tax sharing formula,
although the relative weights to different terms are determined and
derived differently.
(d)Total Grants and Relativities
Deriving g from g*, the total CGC grant for a state can be written
as:
                       Gi = Ni gi                                                                         (12)
The per capita relativity of state i gives its per capita grant
relative to the all state per capita grant, gs. Thus,
                       fi = gi / gs                                                                         (13)
The relativities can be converted into shares:
                      si = Gi / ? Gi   = gi Ni/ gs? Ni = fi [Ni/ ? Ni]                      (14)
A relativity of below one means that a state requires less than an
equal per capita share of the divisible pool.  A relativity above 1 means
that a state requires more than equal per capita share. No state can
have its relativity increased without the relativity of one or more states
being reduced. The relativities are based on the average of the
assessments for the five most recently completed years. Each state’s
relativity for a grant year is the average of its per capita requirement for a
share of the pool in each of the five most recently completed financial
years. Table 9 gives relativities and corresponding shares with respect to
the GST assessments in the 2004 review. It is clear that redistribution is
from NSW and Victoria to the other states in comparison to an equal per
capita distribution. Table 10 describes how the relativities have moved
over time between the 1999 Review and the 2004 Review. Between the31
two Review years, the per capita relativities of New South Wales and the
Northern Territories have both gone down. There is a major change in
the status of Western Australia, whose share had remained below 1 until
the 2003 update. It has become a net recipient in the 2004 Review with a
relativity of more than 1.




















Wales 36505 33.8 35.5 0.86750 29.322 -4.479
Victoria 35810 24.7 25.4 0.86534 21.374 -3.326
Queensland 30727 18.8 16.6 1.05504 19.835 1.035
Western
Australia 38664 9.8 10.9 1.03054 10.099      0.299
Southern
Australia 29286 7.8 6.6 1.20407 9.392 1.592
Tasmania 25024 2.4 1.7 1.55939 3.743 1.343
Australian
Capital
Territory 42549 1.6 2.0 1.12930 1.807 0.207
Northern
Territories 41472 1.0 1.2 4.26538 4.265 3.265
Australia 34769 100.0 100.0 1.00000 99.836 -0.164
* Average of 1998-99 to 2002-03
# 2001-02 based on data from 2001 census
**based on GST relatives (average over 1998-99 to 2002-03)
Source: Tables C-11, E-5 and E-8, Report on State Revenue Sharing
Relatives, 2004 Review, Commonwealth Grants Revnue Sharing32
Table 10: Australia: Per Capita Relativities : 1999
Review to 2004 Review  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
  Review Update Update Update Update Review
New South
Wales 0.89948 0.90913 0.92032 0.90631 0.89117
0.8670.
86750
Victoria 0.86184 0.87049 0.87539 0.86824 0.8701 0.86534
Queensland 1.00687 1.0183 1.00269 1.01174 1.01902 1.05504
Western
Australia 0.94793 0.98365 0.97516 0.97592 0.96946 1.03054
Southern
Australia 1.2068 1.18258 1.17941 1.19447 1.21215 1.20407
Tasmania 1.60905 1.51091 1.50095 1.55419 1.59948 1.55939
Australian
Capital
Territory 1.1027 1.11289 1.14633 1.15216 1.14979 1.12930
Northern
Territories 4.84429 4.16385 4.02166 4.24484 4.38638 4.26538
 Source: Report of  Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004
Review
An interesting issue that arises is whether equalisation
calculations remain valid when the sum of total grants under the CGC
formula is different from the GST amount that is to be distributed.
According to the equalisation calculations, the total distributable amount
is,
                              G* = [(es- rs + ds - os) ? Ni]                                      (15)
This amount can be less than or more than the actual GST
collections. Suppose that GST is a proportion ? of G*, where ? can be
equal to or different from 1.
                        GST = ?. G*                                                                 (16)
If ? = 1, the equalisation calculations remain valid. However,
unless it can be established that standardised expenditures, revenues,
and budget outcomes would fall or rise in the same proportion in which
actual GST is lower or higher than the estimated G*, actual grants may
not be consistent with required equalisation entitlements.  In a recession,
when GST is lower, salaries and other cost elements are not likely to fall
in the same proportion as the fall in revenues. It is implicit in the33
equalisation formula as it is applied that it is homogenous of degree one.
In practice, such a condition may rarely be met.
B.  Features of Revenue Assessment  
The main revenue categories analysed are payroll tax, land
revenue, stamp duty on conveyances, financial transactions taxes,
stamp duties on shares and marketable securities, gambling taxation,
insurance taxation, heavy vehicle registration fees and taxes, light
vehicle registration fees and taxes, stamp duty on motor vehicle
registrations and transfers, other tax revenue, mining revenue, and
contributions by trading enterprises. A list of the assessed revenue
sources is given in Appendix A2.  For each category, the relevant
revenue base for each state is taken up. The actual revenues from all
states are added up. Dividing these revenues by the  aggregate revenue
base of all states gives the average tax rate.
Thus, the average tax rate for any revenue head is given by
                           a =  rs/bs                                                                     (17)
where rs [=? Ri/?Ni]   and bs [=? Bi/?Ni]    indicate all-state per
capita revenue and expenditure from the relevant category.
The standardised per capita  revenue of a state for a given
category is given by
             rij = aj* bij                                                                     (18)
where i refers to the state and j refers to the revenue categories.
Summation of all such terms over the revenue categories gives per
capita standardised total revenue of a state
                         ri = ?i rs    = a bi                                                            (19)
where  a   is a weighted average of the individual all-state
average tax rates.
C.  Features of Expenditure Assessment34
  On the expenditure side also assessment is undertaken in a
disaggregate way. Techniques of expenditure assessment are
recognised to be the unique part of the CGC methodology of
determination of relativities. It is also that component of the methodology
that is often criticised for its complexity and lack of transparency.
The overall methodology can be seen in three steps. Aggregate
expenditures are the sum of category expenditures. Each category of
expenditure consists of a weighted sum of components. Each
component is a function of one or more disability factors, i.e. variables
relating to which disabilities are associated. The main expenditure
categories that are separately assessed relate to education, health and
community services, law, order and public safety, culture and recreation,
and economic activities. A complete list of the expenditure items that
were separately assessed in the 2004 Review is given in Appendix A3.
Expenditures are considered net of user charges. The expenditure
relativity [?i] therefore gives a weighted average of the relativities of the
individual expenditures categories. Many of the disability factors like
wages, administrative scale, socio-demographic composition are
common for several components in different categories of expenditures,
and general methodologies have been developed for treating these
disabilities. Appendix A4 provides an illustration of the application of the
assessment methodology in the case of expenditure category of
‘Inpatients Services’.
D.  Common Disability Factors
A discussion of the disability factors also makes it clear that the
CGC has to resort to judgments at various places, particularly in regard
to weights of different factors affecting expenditure levels where
expenditures are considered net of user charges.
(a) Wages Input Costs
Wages and salaries are major costs incurred by the states,
which differ significantly between states. In the 1999 Review, this
disability was measured by considering the inter-state differences in
average weekly earnings in the non-state sector. This was considered
relevant as these differences were not likely to be affected by state
policies. The Commission averaged the assessments over 10 years and35
halved the interstate differences on the basis of judgment.  In the 2004
Review also, the Commission found that there are significant wage
differentials between states. The underlying wages were well above
average in New South Wales and below average in Queensland, South
Australia, and Tasmania. The Commission undertook an analysis of the
underlying causes of the wage differential on the basis of an econometric
model but considered that the analysis did not ‘provide a fully adequate
basis to estimate disabilities for the smaller states’ (2004 Review, p.40).
Specific adjustments were then made to the model results on the basis
of judgment.
(b) Socio-demographic Composition
Factors like age, sex, income, and location account for
differences in per capita expenditures. The Commission in its 1999
Review assessed socio-demographic composition disabilities by applying
the Australian average use and unit cost weights to the number of people
in each state in different groups characterised by age, sex, income,
location, non-English background, and indigenous status. Use and cost
weights were calculated from national data sets, wherever possible.
Judgment was used when data were not available, particularly in regard
to cost weights for indigenous people living in remote locations and for
people having low English ability. Similar method was applied in the
2004 Review also except that additional costs were provided on account
of cultural and linguistic diversity.
(c) Administrative Scale
Some fixed costs are incurred in all states for providing basic
services regardless of the size of population. In per capita terms, these
costs are higher for less populous states. The administrative scale
factors therefore result into higher relativities for less populous states
and lower relativities for the more populous states. Here again, the
commission had to resort to some judgment. The Commission observes
“Some data for fixed costs are available for most expense categories or
groups of categories but comprehensive estimates call for the use of
judgment” (2004 Review, p.45).
E.  Adjusting for Specific Purpose Payments36
         The Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) are grants from the
commonwealth to the states for specified services, such as health,
education, roads and the environment. Section 96 of the constitution
provides the legal basis for SPPs and other commonwealth grants. It
stipulates that ‘the (commonwealth) Parliament may grant financial
assistance to any state on such terms and conditions as the parliament
thinks fit.”
The commonwealth uses SPPs for a number of reasons. In
particular, SPPs are given to:
•  introduce programs reflecting commonwealth wishes in
areas of State Constitutionals responsibility (the majority of
SPPs);
•  impose or encourage national standards (e.g. free public
health and vocational training standards);
•  pay states for the delivery of commonwealth programmes
(there are only a few examples of this sort e.g.  funding legal
aid for  federal law cases);
•  compensate states for the cost of commonwealth initiatives
(such as the cost of the States of increased access to
pensioner concessions); and
•  comply with international obligations (e.g. payments to help
manage World Heritage areas).
The SPPs were introduced in the 1920s to provide assistance for
road construction and debt costs.  These remained limited in scope until
after World War II.  Following World War II there was a gradual increase
in the number of tied grants programmes, including those for housing,
education, agriculture, some health programs and infrastructure
development.  The SPPs increased markedly in the mid-1970s under the
Whitlam Government, with comprehensive funding for education and
public hospitals and the provision of general purpose grants for local
governments.  Since then, SPPs have continued to increase slowly as a
proportion of total commonwealth funding to the states.
The specific purpose grants are administered by the statutory
commissions appointed by the commonwealth government.  These
constitute about 20 percent of the total expenditure of the states. The
distribution of specific purpose payments hinges on several factors,
including the historical distribution, which was often arbitrary or reflected37
commonwealth’s policy priorities. In applying the equalisation principle,
the CGC takes into account all operating revenues available including
the SPPs, except those quarantined, that is excluded, before calculating
its relative need for revenue from the GST-HCG pool.
         The SPPs are subject to individual agreements, which include a
variety of terms and conditions to the grants.  They are also usually
classified as either: payments to the states for programmes administered
by the states or payments ‘through’ the states, which are payments to be
passed on to other bodies, principally non-government schools and  local
governments.
The SPPs have grown substantially in importance over time,
increasing from 22 percent of total commonwealth payment in 1942-43 to
51 percent of total commonwealth payments in 2001-02. Over time The
SPPs have also proliferated in number. The Commonwealth identified
over 120 separate SPPs, many of which consist of a number of sub-
programmes. Questions have often been raised about the efficiency of
maintaining a large number of small SPP programs. Since many of the
SPPs are in areas in which the states have sole responsibility under the
constitution, questions arise as to whether it is efficient and appropriate
for the commonwealth to be determining  priorities in such  areas.
Commonwealth conditions on SPPs show substantial variation.  Some of
the largest SPP programmes (e.g.funding for government schools and
hospitals) have a limited set of conditions and provide the states with a
relatively high degree of flexibility to provide services consistent with the
general objectives of these SPPs, whereas small SPP programmes can
involve substantial commonwealth oversight and micro management.
In its assessment exercise, the CGC divides the SPPs into three
main categories: SPPs considered out of scope for the assessment
exercise, SPPs treated by exclusion, and SPPs treated by inclusion in
the assessment exercise. Most of the major SPPs are considered by
inclusion. The effect of the CGC’s method of inclusion is to neutralise
allocation priorities of the SPPs as higher SPP allocations would result in
lower untied grants and  vice versa. Garnaut and FitzGerald (2002)
observe in their Review (Final Report 2002, p 11): “The CGC effectively
overrides the assessments that underlie most SPP allocations, which are
determined under direct legislative and ministerial authority.”38
VI. Some Issues in Assessment
The outcome of such a comprehensive equalisation exercise in
Australia is to reduce horizontal imbalance in the state expenditures.
Table 11 shows that this objective is successfully achieved. If the
territories are excluded, the actual expenditures are within a narrow
range from the all-state mean. The difference between the minimum and
maximum per capita expenditure relative to the all-state average is in the
range of 19 to 22 percentage points. The per capita expenditure in the
northern territories is however more than double of the all-state average.
This is the outcome primarily of the additional costs of providing services
in this region. The coefficient of variation of the expenditures relative to
the average is limited in the range of 7 to 10 per cent if the Territories are
excluded. In contrast, the outcome of the overall transfer process in India
still leaves considerable horizontal imbalance in the system. It is also
clear that states which receive larger grants have larger per capita
expenditures implying larger public sectors in these states.
            Table 11: Australia Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance
   Per Capita Expenditure Relative to All-State Average (percent)
  1999-00 2000-01 2001-02
New South Wales 98.27 95.39 96.30
Victoria 90.85 91.01 88.93
Queensland 90.79 98.22 104.44
Western Australia 113.01 111.91 107.17
Southern Australia 112.68 106.67 106.29
Tasmania 111.10 112.19 108.31
Australian Capital Territory 119.56 126.62 115.38
Northern Territories 265.84 266.36 249.00
Australia 100.00 100.00 100.00
Minimum 90.79 91.01 88.93
Maximum exc territories 113.01 112.19 108.31
Range 22.22 21.18 19.38
Coefficient of Variation(exc territories) 10. 5 8.7 8.5
 Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004 Review, Supporting Information
Note: Expenditures are compiled from the equalisation budget.
In the context of CGC’s assessment procedures regarding
horizontal fiscal equalisation, several issues, particularly those related to
its impact on efficiency, have been raised from time to time. These
issues have become even more important in the context of the transition39
from sharing the FAG pool to sharing a GST-HCG pool. Some of these
issues are discussed below.
a.  Extent of Redistribution
The main outcome of the exercise of horizontal fiscal
equalisation is redistribution of revenue resources among states. The
CGC calculates the extent of redistribution compared to a situation of
equal per capita allocations. Table 12 shows that the extent of
redistribution has ranged from 11.4 percent in 1981-82 to a low level of 6
per cent in 2001-02. It is also shown that the extent of redistribution has
come down over the years. The extent of redistribution can also be
measured in terms of what the donor states would have received on a
per capita basis. For example, in 2002-03, on per capita basis, New
South Wales and Victoria together would have received $21951 million,
and the amount redistributed is 11.3 per cent of this.













1981-82 1981Review 8202.9 932.4 11.37
1982-83 1982 Review 9217.9 1023.5 11.10
1985-86 1985Review 11826.3 1205.7 10.20
1988-89 1988 Review 16019.9 1265 7.90
1993-94 1993 Review 17315.7 1632 9.42
1999-00 1999 Review 23064.6 1692.1 7.34
2000-01 2000 Update 30506.3 1961 6.43
2001-02 2001 Update 33209.7 1988.5 5.99
2002-03 2002 Update 37555.7 2472.4 6.58
2003-04 2003 Update 38825.2 2747.5 7.08
2004-05 2004 Update 41594.1 3213.7 7.73
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004 Review
b. Revenue and Expenditure Equalisations: Relative Roles
The distinguishing feature of the Australian fiscal equalisation
exercise is the importance that is given to expenditure side equalisation.40
Revenue side equalisation is practiced, for example, in Canada also, and
the two systems in their mechanics are quite similar. While in Canada, in
the general purpose grant calculation only revenue side equalisation is
done, Australia undertakes both revenue side and expenditure side
equalisation. Interestingly, as table 13 indicates, expenditure equalisation
is the stronger influence since the redistribution through expenditure
requirement at $2521.4 million is greater than that owing to revenue
raising capacity at $1880.7 million. It can also be seen that New South
Wales loses more because of its higher revenue raising capacity than on
account of assessment of expenditure requirements. On the other hand,
Victoria suffers only because of expenditure equalisation.
Table 13 :Relative Contribution of Revenue, Expenditure and SPP











New South Wales -1159.6 -625.5 69.6 -1715.50
Victoria 488.6 -1871.9 97.9 -1285.40
Queensland 262.6 132.4 21.2 416.20
Western Australia -721.2 840.8 0.6 120.20
Southern Australia 668.8 -9.4 -49.9 609.50
Tasmania 327.5 226.3 -37.8 516.00
Australian Capital Territory 102.1 -13.7 -6.0 82.40
Northern Territories 31.1 1321.9 -95.6 1257.40
All States* 1880.7 2521.4 189.4 4591.50
* sum of positive amounts
 Source: Report of  Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004 Review
c.  Macro Approach in Revenue Equalisation
As far as the revenue-side equalisation is concerned, the
approaches in Canada and Australia are quite similar. In both cases, a
tax-by-tax approach is followed with the average all-state tax rate being
applied to the actual tax base of each state. The difference is in the41
nature of taxes themselves. While in Canada, most of the major taxes
are used by the provinces including income and corporate taxes as also
the GST, in Australia, states are left with a very limited and specialised
set of taxes. This also has a bearing on the issue whether a macro
approach rather than a tax by tax approach would be better. In the
Canadian case, the individual tax bases are more likely to be highly
correlated to a macro base  than in Australia where the taxes under
consideration are small and specialised. Nevertheless, the issue of
substituting a macro base for the tax by tax approach has been
discussed in Australia also. In the macro or global approach each state is
free to choose any combination of utilisation of the tax bases available to
it as long as it produces the same overall revenue result. The CGC
recognises the importance of the global approach when it observes: “A
global approach assumes that, whatever the legal incidence of a
particular form of revenue, its ultimate effective incidence would fall on
income or be reflected in the value of production…The type of tax base
adopted has implications for the nature of equalisation. The use of global
(and sub-global) bases tends to imply that equalisation is about the
capacity of State to pay tax. The use of tax bases tends to imply that
equalisation is about the capacity of state governments to raise
revenues” (CGC, 1992).
Collins (2000) (pp. 49-54) shows that use of a global approach
leads to results that are quite different from those of a tax by tax
approach. He lists the following arguments against using partial
measures, i.e., tax by tax approach in measuring fiscal capacity:
•  Individual tax bases are not necessarily related directly
to state taxpayers' ability to pay.
•  It is possible for the states to adjust their calculated
•  taxable capacities by varying tax mixes and tax policies.
•  Partial measures are not policy neutral-for example,
improvement in rail network of a state might reduce its motor
vehicle tax capacity; on the other hand, improvement of
suburban transport facilities might lead, through higher land
prices, to higher land tax capacity.
•  Federal tax policies can affect states’ taxable capacities-
for example reduction in capital gains tax rate may through
raising property prices and property turnover, increase
revenues from land taxes and stamp duties.42
Collins argues that significant data problems exist in Australia in
measuring global tax bases. He observes (Collins, 2000, p.53) that there
are serious data difficulties with state national account statistics. The
narrow tax bases left with the Australian states is also an issue as they
are poorly correlated with global measures of fiscal capacity. Favouring
the adoption of global measures of fiscal capacity in the longer run, he
observes (p.53): “While the balance of the argument might lie with the
use, in the long run, of global rather than partial measures of states’
taxable capacities, it does not appear possible at this stage to mount
conclusive arguments in favor of either approach.” Given the narrow tax
base of the states in Australia, a tax-by-tax approach may have more
relevance. The Indian situation is quite different as the tax base of the
states is much wider.
d.  Equity Issues
While the CGC methodology has successfully equalised access
to resources to the states provided they make comparable revenue
effort, the effect of the scheme of transfers on equity objectives have
often been questioned. Horizontal equity refers to ‘equal treatment of
individuals in equal circumstances’. Garnaut and FitGerald (2002) in their
Review note that “There are well known systematic regional differences
in the quality of service available to Australians (e.g. between
metropolitan, provincial, rural and remote areas. Some differences are
inevitable, reflecting differences in costs of provision of services, while
others are amenable to policy change”. They argue that “the CGC’s
approach has equalised States” capacity to provide services, not service
provision”. In particular, they argue that it is possible to base an HFE
distribution on monitoring and evaluating outcomes without prescribing
them.
In theory, equalisation has always been about equalising fiscal
capacities. Actual outcomes may yet differ because of differences in
policies and preferences as well as efficiency in different states. There is,
however, some evidence of convergence in the provision of services as
the proportion of redistribution of the total pool of distribution (table 12)
has steadily come down.
e.  Efficiency Issues43
The issue of efficiency in federal arrangements can be
considered in terms of whether decentralisation of expenditure is
efficiency augmenting, and if that is so, whether equalisation transfers
help promote efficiency of the sub-national governments. In the general
literature on efficiency implications of decentralisation (e.g. Oates,1972),
the source of efficiency is traced mainly either to the possibility of non-
uniform provision of local public goods based on lower signaling costs of
local preferences or to greater competition among jurisdictions
(Breton,1996). In both cases, however, a variety of decentralisation
failures (Prud’homme, 1995; Breton, 2002) may constrain the efficiency-
augmenting effects. Some of the cases of decentralisation failure listed,
for example, in Breton (2002) relate to costs of information, political
participation costs, coordination costs, diminishing supply costs, and
dynamic instability arising from unhealthy ‘race to bottom’ type
competition.
In their Review of Commonwealth-State Funding, Garnaut and
FitzGerald (2002) have summarised in their final report several types of
efficiency-reducing effects of the transfer arrangements in Australia.
They argue that equalising transfers tend to:
•  reduce the incentives for resources to locate in higher
productivity locations;
•  reduce the capacity for investment in human resource
development in low productivity regions to enhance national
economic potential;
•  increase the overhead and transactions costs of managing
the system;
•  discourages the attraction and retention of high-value mobile
resources in an international market;
•  leads to duplication, lack of co-ordination and game playing
by officials;
•  unduly enlarges the role of the public sector;
•  encourages grant-seeking behavior, particularly where
states have the capacity to influence the CGC’s assessed
standard budget;
•  dilutes incentives for cost reducing reforms;
•  discourages growth promoting policies if the benefits of
growth are mostly transferred to others;44
Garnaut and FitzGerald observe that most of these efficiency
reducing effects arise from the expenditure side of equalisation: “ It is
common to perceive the efficiency costs as arising principally from
compensation for disabilities on the expenditure side, through their
tendency to discourage movement of people out of high cost locations.”
They also note that states that are larger recipients of equalisation grants
have noticeably larger public sectors. Thus, they observe: “there are
signs that the exceptionally large role of the public sector and
exceptionally small role of the private sector in some states that are large
recipients of transfers, notably Tasmania and South Australia, have
changed the political orientation in ways that are unfavorable to growth.”
The theoretical literature on equalisation, particularly the
contributions by Buchanan, 1950; Scott, 1950; Buchanan and Wagner,
1971; Graham, 1964;  Gramlich, 1985 and Mathews ,1993 has looked at
the issue of the implications of equalisation, especially expenditure side
equalisation on efficiency in detail. While Scott had argued way back in
1950 that equalisation is detrimental to efficiency because it impedes
mobility of factors of production to locations where they would be most
productive, Buchanan and Wagner have argued that efficiency would be
impeded if migration is fiscally induced by states providing more public
goods at lower tax costs. They argued that rich states can induce
migration by providing higher net fiscal benefit but, eventually owing to
the existence of congestible goods, the net fiscal benefit will fall. As too
many people migrate to the richer states, there will be a loss of efficiency
in the economy as a whole. This incentive towards excessive migration
in their view ought to be neutralised through fiscal equalisation. Under
these circumstances, equalisation is consistent with equity and
efficiency.
Gramlich (1985) particularly questioned expenditure side
equalisation by arguing that this removes any disincentives for people to
move from high cost areas to low cost areas and therefore raises the
overall costs of service provision. He favored that no allowance should
be made for expenditure disabilities. In response Mathews (1985) had
argued that expenditure side equalisation was an essential ingredient of
overall equalisation. Grewal and Mathews (1983) also showed that
locational choice is usually influenced by private production and
consumption activities rather than by fiscal and other activities of the
governments. While there may be a case for making transfers taking into
account cost disabilities due to structural and exogenous factors, policy-45
induced disabilities should not be neutralised. However, in practice, it is
often difficult to separate one from the other and measure their impact.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
As compared to Australia, India has not only a larger number of
states and a larger population but also greater concentration of
population in low fiscal capacity states. Fiscal transfers aimed at
horizontal equalisation therefore call for larger redistribution in India. The
differences in the size, heterogeneity and the scale of problems
notwithstanding, the conceptual basis of the transfer system in Australia
has much relevance for India. At the same time, serious difficulties have
been noted with the Australian system also. Some of the important
differences, similarities, and essential lessons in respect of the vertical
and horizontal dimensions of transfers are summarised below.
•  The Australian system is characterised by a high degree of vertical
imbalance and centralisation of expenditure. In raising revenues, the
Indian system is also characterised by high vertical imbalance but
somewhat lower than that in Australia. Also, centralisation of
expenditure after transfers in Australia is higher than that in India. In
the context of Australian vertical imbalance, Mathews(1993) had
observed: “It is a paradox that Australia has combined the world’s
finest system of horizontal fiscal equalisation with one of the most
vertically unbalanced fiscal systems. The threat to horizontal fiscal
equalisation in Australia arises not from any inherent defects in fiscal
equalisation, but from pressures which are being placed on it by
continuing failure to restore vertical fiscal balance. It is the
commonwealth tax monopoly that needs to be dismantled and not
the system of fiscal capacity equalisation”. Since Mathews wrote,
with the GST arrangement, vertical fiscal imbalance has gone up
rather than down. Large vertical imbalance may be justified in
situations where horizontal imbalances are large requiring correction
through equalisation transfers. This does not appear to be the case
in Australia.46
•  In Australia, the determination of the vertical share of resources to be
transferred to the states is not in the hands of the Commonwealth
Grants Commission. It gets determined automatically by the amount
of revenues collected under the GST supplemented by the Special
Purpose grants which are also in the hands of the Commonwealth
government. In India, the Finance Commission determines a large
part of the transfers in the form of tax devolution under global sharing
and grants, requiring it to determine in some way the vertical
imbalance. The Finance Commission transfers are supplemented by
the Planning Commission grants and other discretionary grants
determined by the central government. Global tax sharing may have
some merits over the sharing of a single tax as in Australia where the
collecting agency, namely the Commonwealth government has no
revenue interest. Deciding about vertical transfers facilitates
horizontal equalisation and to that extent India has an institutional
advantage.
•  Australia has one of the most elaborate systems of determining
equalisation transfers. The Australian equalisation payments are
based on explicit principles that aim at enabling states to provide its
citizens services at comparable standards if they are willing to make
comparable revenue efforts and are able to operate at comparable
levels of efficiency. The overall approach to equalisation is with
reference to entire transfers as most special purpose payments are
integrated into the equalisation calculations. The Australian system is
sound in principle but the methodology adopted particularly with
respect to equalising expenditure disabilities has made the system
unduly complex. The system is still grappling with issues of
efficiency. From the Indian perspective, the major lesson to be drawn
from the Australian experience is the need for a clearer enunciation
of the equalisation objective and its translation in practice is called
for. It may be practical to consider a macro base for revenue side
equalisation and focus expenditure equalisation in respect of select
services where mobility is limited.
•  An important feature of the Australian system is its emphasis on cost
disabilities. In India, some consideration is given to cost disabilities
through incorporation of factors such as area and infrastructure in
the devolution formula. The emphasis has to be on neutralising
structural and exogenous cost disabilities. Correcting policy induced
cost disabilities may lead to a loss in efficiency. Separating one from
the other is, however, a difficult task.47
•  The relativities in Australia and the shares in tax devolution in India
are determined using past data. In this, Australia may have an
advantage since they use a rolling forward method for each update
of the relativities. The time-lag is, therefore, much less in their case
than in India. However, in both countries, the shares are applied to
transfers, which are not known in advance. The Australian transfer
system does not use any projections. It treats the grant entitlement
emerging from the most recent data as appropriate for the year for
which the transfers are made. In the Indian case, since transfers are
to be determined for a period five years ahead and since, in addition
to tax sharing, grants are to be specified in absolute amounts,
projections are required.
•  The working of the Australian Loan Council has relevance for India
where consideration of sub-national borrowing in a framework of
sustainability and macroeconomic stability is desirable. There is
need for an institutional arrangement for keeping the growth of
central and state debt within prudent limits and consistent with
requirements of macroeconomic stability. In fact, as in Australia,
states should be allowed to raise loans in the market subject to
agreed limits and there is no need for the central government to
intermediate. Over time, such an arrangement can lead to better
discipline.
End Notes
1  The terms of reference called for:
a.  an inquiry into and report upon, by 25 February 2004 at the latest, the
question of per capita relativities which the Commission would regard as
appropriate to apply after 2003-04 for the distribution of the combined pool of48
GST revenue grants and health care grants among the States, the Northern
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory.
b.  a review as to whether the allowances for special circumstances granted to
the Australian Capital Territory continue to be necessary and, if so, make
appropriate assessments.
iii. Preparation of a work programme for improving methods of assessment and
consult with the States and the Commonwealth in deciding the priorities for the
work programme.
2 These payments include (but are not necessarily limited to): (a) National
Competition Payments; (b) states’ contribution the commonwealth’s deficit
reduction strategy; (c) payments to the states to reimburse them for revenue lost
as a result of the establishment of a national scheme of companies, securities
and future regulation; (d) payments which are funded from the National Heritage
Trust of Australia and the Regional Telecommunications Infrastructure Fund;
(e) payments for the Fringe Benefit Tax Transitional Grants for the public and
not-for-profit hospitals; (f) payments for Building IT Strengths–Tasmanian
‘Intelligent Island’;(g) payments for Connecting Tasmanian Schools; (h)
payments for the Extension of the First Home Owners Scheme; (i)payments for
the Roads to Recovery program; and (j) Commonwealth payments made to the
Sinking Fund on State Debt.
3 These components are (a) payments in relation to mental health; (b) payments
in relation to the National Health Development Fund; (c) payments in relation to
the Pathways Home Initiative; (d) all payments under an adjustment module,
including those related to the Critical and Urgent Treatment (CUT) Waiting List
Initiative; and (e) Compliance payment arrangements (in this case including the
maximum available compliance payments in the assessments).
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Appendix A1:Difference between GST and FAG Relativities
Table A1 below provides a comparison between GST and FAG
relativities as assessed in the 2004 review. Although the CGC was not
asked to provide estimates in the 2004 review for the FAG relativities, i.e.
relativities calculated with the assumption that the old system of financial
grants continued. A comparison with the 2004 GST relativities shows
that New South Wales and Victoria gain in the GST relativities as52
compared to the FAG relativities. Their FAG relativities have gone down
considerably compared to the corresponding relativities in 1999-00.






































Wales 0.86750 0.80363 0.06387 33.71 2.153 0.89948 -0.09585
Victoria 0.86534 0.83480 0.03054 24.74 0.755 0.86184 -0.02704
Queenslan
d 1.05504 1.10104 -0.04600 19.00 -0.874 1.00687 0.09417
Western
Australia 1.03054 1.00781 0.02273 9.81 0.223 0.94793 0.05988
Southern
Australia 1.20407 1.30402 -0.09995 7.71 -0.770 1.2068 0.09722
Tasmania 1.55939 1.74908 -0.18969 2.40 -0.456 1.60905 0.14003
Australian
Capital
Territory 1.12930 1.16529 -0.03599 1.63 -0.059 1.1027 0.06259
Northern
Territories 4.26538 5.22706 -0.96168 1.00 -0.964 4.84429 0.38277
Source: Report of  Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2004 Review( Tables 3-1,4-2,D-11
Appendix A2 : State Taxes in Australia
Payroll tax              
Stamp duties
On contracts and conveyances of property
(other than shares and marketable securities)
On unlisted shares and marketable
securities53






Stamp duties on mortgages and loan
securities








Motor vehicle weight/engine capacity tax
Driver license fees




           
Appendix A3 : Australia:Main State Expenditure Categories
     
A. Education
1 Pre-school education
2 Government school education
3 Non-government school education
4 Vocational education and training
5 Higher education54
6 Transport of rural school children
B. Health and Community Services
7 In-patient services
8 Non-inpatient and community health services
9 Population and preventive health
10 Family and child services
11 Aged and disabled services
12 Homeless and general welfare
13 Housing
14 First Home Owners Scheme
15 Services to indigenous communities
C. Law and Order and Public safety
16 Police
17 Administration of justice
18 Corrective services
19 Public safety
D. Culture and Recreation
20 Culture and recreation
21 National parks and wild life services
E. Economic activities
22 Electricity and gas





28 Mining, fuel, and energy
29 Tourism
30 Manufacturing and other industry
31 Subsidies-petroleum products
32 Subsidies-alcohol products
F. General Public services
33 Superannuation
34 GST administration costs
35 General public services
36 Debt charges
37 Depreciation  55
Appendix A4: In-patients Services: Example of Expenditure
Assessment Techniques
We look at this category as an illustration of the Australian
expenditure assessment techniques. The In-patients Services category
expenditure is obtained as a weighted sum of five components, namely,
scale affected expenditure, hospital acute in-patient services, hospital
non-acute in-patient services, patient transport, and isolation. Costs in
respect of each of these components are individually affected by a set of
disability factors like administrative scale, input costs, hospital costs,
costs of patient transport and costs related to isolation. On the use side,
costs depend primarily on the socio-demographic composition, which
affect the individual component costs. Table A2 provides the
components and their determinants for In-patients expenditure category.
The component weights were determined from national average cost
data for acute, non-acute, and mental health in-patients. The cost of
patient transport component was determined from national average cost
from state data returns and from cost of patient transport data based on
the 2000-01 Australian Hospital Statistics Report from the Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare.
Administrative scale refers to fixed costs and generally covers
head office expenses. This is a component of expenditure, which is
present in all expenditure categories considered by the CGC. Fixed costs
for each state under the hospital in-patients category were assessed to
be $8.16 million for each state in the 2004 Review. An extra fixed cost of
$0.69 million was assessed for the Northern Territory for dual policy
development tasks that it has to perform owing to high proportion of
indigenous population. The input costs factor covers costs of labor, office
accommodation, and electricity. For scale affected costs components,
those factors were applied with the following proportions of standard
expenses: wages and salaries (80 percent), accommodation (2 percent),
and electricity (1 percent).
The acute in-patients services component considers three
disability factors relating to socio-demographic composition, hospital
costs, and input costs. The socio-demographic composition factor is
assessed to reflect the use and unit cost influences of different
population groups on the total cost of acute in-patient services. This56
factor is based on Australian standard hospital use rates and Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRG) cost weights for different population groups. The
socio-demographic composition factor takes account of use rates and
costs in respect of groups distinguished by age, sex, Indigeneity, low
English fluency, population location, and socio-economic status. Use
rates measure standard use of in-patient services. DRG weights
measure relative costs of treating patients. Data on the use and cost of
services by different population groups were derived from the National
Hospital Morbidity Dataset in the 1999 Review. Data on the number of
people in state populations were from the Census of Population and
Housing. The 2004 Review also used data from the ABS National Health
Survey and the National Hospitals In-patients Data. The 2004 Review
also worked out an extra cost weight for the disability factor related to
Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) groups. There was also a
socio-economic status (SES) weight to account for the greater use of
public hospital in-patient services by people from low socio-economic
groups.
The non-acute in-patients component was also assessed as the
in-patients component using socio-demographic composition, hospital
costs and input costs as factors. Since the cost of treating a private
patient in public hospital is less than the cost of treating a public patient
in public hospital, a cost discount was applied. This discount was 12
percent in the 1999 Review, which was reduced to 9 percent in the 2004
Review. The availability of private sector hospital facilities in a state
reduces the burden on the public hospitals. This also called for
adjustments. Table A2 gives the component weights. In each case, the
contribution of a component to category expenditure is calculated as the
component weight multiplied by the component factor. The component
factor is the term given in brackets and is a function of the disability
factors in the  formulae  described below. The symbols are defined as
below:
Fixed costs (scale) = SAE
Acute Inpatients Component = AINP
Non-acute In-patients Component = NAINP
Cost of Patient Transport = CPT
Isolation Component = ISO
Fixed costs input costs factor = ic_sae
Administrative scale factor = s
Hospital costs factor = hc
Socio-demographic composition acute in-patients = sdc_anmp57
Socio-demographic composition non acute in-patients adc_naimp
Input costs acute in-patients = input costs non acute in-patients = ic_oth
Cost of patient transport (dispersion factor) = cpt
Isolation factor = iso
The component contribution equations are given by
SAE = w1* (ic_sae*s)
AINP = w2* [(hc+sdc_ainp-1)*ic_oth




Expenditures are considered net of user charges. An important
part of the assessment exercise is to assess the user charges. This
assessment is based on national average use rates of private patients in
public hospitals, adjusted for age, sex, region, indigeneity, and income.
Patient fees derived from in-patients, non-in-patients and same day
patients in all public hospitals are covered. The standardised number of
private patients by the different categories multiplied by the standard
user charges gives the assessed user charge.





































expenditure 0.44 * A
Hospital acute
inpatient services 84.71 B * *
Hospital non-acute
inpatient services 13.23 B * *
Patient transport 1.49 *
Isolation 0.12           *
Basis of  calculation; weights in parenthesis
Input costs(A)
General method with Wages (80percent), accommodation
(2percent), electricity (1percent)
Input costs(B)










Age, Aboriginity, income, region, and low English
fluency
Hospital costs
Based on the average cost of treatment by region to account for
dispersion,




Dispersion factor: based on general dispersion method for air
travel,




method      
Source: Draft Assessment Paper CGC 2003/28, Inpatients Services Assessment,
Commonwealth Grants Commission
The related calculations are given in Table A3.
Table A3 : In-patient Service Costs Derivation of the Service Factor
Factors NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT
Fixed costs 0.44 percent
Administrative scale
factor 0.340 0.463 0.615 1.178 1.487 4.774 7.000 18.94559
Fixed costs input
costs factor 1.035 0.990 0.974 0.982 0.971 0.920 1.013 1.090
Component factor 0.352 0.458 0.600 1.156 1.445 4.392 7.092 20.648
Contribution to
category factor 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.019 0.031 0.091
Acute inpatients 84.71 percent
Hospital costs factor 0.994 0.999 0.992 1.023 1.006 0.977 1.018 1.122
Socio-demographic
composition 0.992 0.971 1.014 0.995 1.063 1.112 0.754 1.436
Input costs: acute
inpatients 1.031 0.991 0.977 0.984 0.975 0.929 1.011 1.090
Component factor 1.016 0.961 0.983 1.003 1.041 1.011 0.782 1.698
Contribution to
category factor 0.861 0.814 0.833 0.849 0.882 0.857 0.662 1.438
Non acute inpatients 13.23 percent
Hospital costs factor 0.994 0.999 0.992 1.023 1.006 0.977 1.018 1.122
Socio-demographic
composition 0.982 1.021 0.976 0.914 1.216 1.257 0.564 0.774
Input costs: acute
inpatients 1.031 0.991 0.977 0.984 0.975 0.929 1.011 1.090
Component factor 1.007 1.011 0.947 0.923 1.191 1.146 0.589 0.977
Contribution to
category factor 0.133 0.134 0.125 0.122 0.158 0.152 0.078 0.129
Cost of patient
transport 1.49 percent
Dispersion factor 0.9339 0.6145 1.5586 1.1956 0.8497 0.7798 0.1912 3.3280
Component factor 0.9339 0.6145 1.5586 1.1956 0.8497 0.7798 0.1912 3.3280
Contribution to
category factor 0.0139 0.0092 0.0232 0.0178 0.0127 0.0116 0.0028 0.0496
Isolation 0.12 percent
Isolation factor 0.051 0.107 0.178 0.748 0.565 3.495 1.518 68.272
Component factor 0.051 0.107 0.178 0.748 0.565 3.495 1.518 68.272
Contribution to
category factor 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.082
Category factor 1.0098 0.9591 0.9843 0.9951 1.0594 1.0433 0.7759 1.7899
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, Draft assessment Paper CGC 2003/2858
























affected expenditure 0.44 * A
Hospital acute inpatient
services 84.71 B * *
Hospital non-acute
inpatient services 13.23 B * *
Patient transport 1.49 *
Isolation 0.12           *
Basis of  calculation; weights in parenthesis
Input costs(A)
General method with Wages (80percent), accommodation (2percent), electricity
(1percent)
Input costs(B)
General method with Wages (70percent), accommodation (2percent), electricity
(1percent)
Administrative scale General method
Socio-demographic
composition Cost –weighted utilisation rates by
Age, Aboriginity, income, region, and low English  fluency
Hospital costs Based on the average cost of treatment by region to account for dispersion,
Service delivery scale and research and use complexity
Cost of patient transport Dispersion factor: based on general dispersion method for air travel,
 inter-regional travel and local travel
Isolation Isolation factor: general method      
Source: Draft Assessment Paper CGC 2003/28, Inpatients Services Assessment, Commonwealth Grants Commission59
The related calculations are given in Table A3.
Table A3 : In-patient Service Costs Derivation of the Service Factor
Factors NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT
Fixed costs 0.44 percent
Administrative scale
factor 0.340 0.463 0.615 1.178 1.487 4.774 7.000 18.945
Fixed costs input
costs factor 1.035 0.990 0.974 0.982 0.971 0.920 1.013 1.090
Component factor 0.352 0.458 0.600 1.156 1.445 4.392 7.092 20.648
Contribution to
category factor 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.019 0.031 0.091
Acute inpatients 84.71 percent
Hospital costs factor 0.994 0.999 0.992 1.023 1.006 0.977 1.018 1.122
Socio-demographic
composition 0.992 0.971 1.014 0.995 1.063 1.112 0.754 1.436
Input costs: acute
inpatients 1.031 0.991 0.977 0.984 0.975 0.929 1.011 1.090
Component factor 1.016 0.961 0.983 1.003 1.041 1.011 0.782 1.698
Contribution to
category factor 0.861 0.814 0.833 0.849 0.882 0.857 0.662 1.438
Non acute inpatients 13.23 percent
Hospital costs factor 0.994 0.999 0.992 1.023 1.006 0.977 1.018 1.122
Socio-demographic
composition 0.982 1.021 0.976 0.914 1.216 1.257 0.564 0.774
Input costs: acute
inpatients 1.031 0.991 0.977 0.984 0.975 0.929 1.011 1.090
Component factor 1.007 1.011 0.947 0.923 1.191 1.146 0.589 0.97760
Table A3 : In-patient Service Costs Derivation of the Service Factor
Factors NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT
Contribution to
category factor 0.133 0.134 0.125 0.122 0.158 0.152 0.078 0.129
Cost of patient
transport 1.49 percent
Dispersion factor 0.9339 0.6145 1.5586 1.1956 0.8497 0.7798 0.1912 3.3280
Component factor 0.9339 0.6145 1.5586 1.1956 0.8497 0.7798 0.1912 3.3280
Contribution to
category factor 0.0139 0.0092 0.0232 0.0178 0.0127 0.0116 0.0028 0.0496
Isolation 0.12 percent
Isolation factor 0.051 0.107 0.178 0.748 0.565 3.495 1.518 68.272
Component factor 0.051 0.107 0.178 0.748 0.565 3.495 1.518 68.272
Contribution to
category factor 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.082
Category factor 1.0098 0.9591 0.9843 0.9951 1.0594 1.0433 0.7759 1.7899
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, Draft assessment Paper CGC 2003/28